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but, alternatively, upon the reasoning that dismissals were warranted in the furtherance of justice under section 170.30(1)(g) of
the CPL. Indeed, the Douglass Court noted that such a dismissal
is warranted when a court, upon consideration of enumerated statutory factors, concludes that continued prosecution would prove
unjust.6 7 It is therefore suggested that in circumstances demonstrating failure to prosecute, section 170.30(1)(g) of the CPL may
be invoked by trial courts as a viable ground for dismissal.6 8
Steven G. Yudin

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 220.10: The People may not withdraw consent to a negoti67 60 N.Y.2d at 206, 456 N.E.2d at 1185, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 62.

08 See People v. Wingard, 33 N.Y.2d 192, 196, 306 N.E.2d 402, 404, 351 N.Y.S.2d 385,
387-88 (1973); People v. Kitt, 93 App. Div. 2d 77, 78, 460 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (lst Dep't 1983);
People v. Fagg, 86 Misc. 2d 1046, 1047, 385 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (Ontario County Ct. 1976). In
Wingard, the Court, in noting that the power to dismiss an information pursuant to CPL §
170.40 lies within the discretion of the trial judge, held that the failure of the prosecutor to
appear in court on the date set for trial caused an unexcusable imposition on both court
time and on the defendants. 33 N.Y.2d at 196, 306 N.E.2d at 404, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 387-88. In
that such behavior was "inconsistent with an intention on the part of the People to diligently prosecute the defendants," the Court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the informations in the furtherance of justice pursuant to CPL § 170.40. Id. at 196, 306 N.E.2d at
404, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 388. In a similar vein, the court in Kitt concluded that although "failure to prosecute" is not an enumerated ground for dismissal under the Criminal Procedure
Law, it nevertheless constitutes a cause for seeking dismissals and therefore should be governed by the Criminal Procedure Law. 93 App. Div. 2d at 78, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 800. Moreover, in Fagg, the court remarked that "[a]n example of a dismissal in the interests of justice is when a court dismisses for failure of the district attorney in timely prosecuting a
charge, although that failure does not amount to a denial of a speedy trial." 86 Misc. 2d at
1047, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 744 (quoting R. PrrLuR, supra note 50, § 8.13, at 403).
Further support for the view that dismissals in the "furtherance of justice" may be
based upon failure of prosecution is found in a decision by the Court of Appeals. In People
v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241, 376 N.E.2d 179, 405 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1978), the Court stated that
"'unreasonable delay in prosecuting a defendant constitutes a denial of due process of
law,'" and that "the [s]tate due process requirement of a prompt prosecution is broader
than the right to a speedy trial guaranteed by statute." Id. at 253, 376 N.E.2d at 186, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 25 (quoting People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 789, 791, 364 N.E.2d 1111, 1113, 396
N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (1977)). It is submitted that the Singer decision incorporates a recognition that circumstances exist that will justify dismissals for want of prosecution even though
the time constraints of the speedy trial statute have not been violated.
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ated plea subsequent to modification of a material term by the

Appellate Division
The disposition of criminal indictments by consensus between
the People and the defendant is an essential tool in the efficient
administration of criminal justice. 9 Section 220.10 of the CPL,
which governs the use of plea bargaining"0 in New York, requires
the consent of both the court and the prosecution to any negotiated plea of guilty that has the effect of reducing the charges
against a defendant. 1 Courts have construed this measure to af"' Notwithstanding early reluctance to use the negotiated guilty plea, see, e.g., People v.
Gowasky, 219 App. Div. 19, 24, 219 N.Y.S. 373, 379 (1st Dep't 1926); see also Alschuler, Plea
Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 20 (1979), nearly 90% of convictions currently are obtained without resort to trial, see J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GuiLTY PLEAS
§ 1.2 at 1-2 (2d ed. 1983); Comment, Plea Bargains:What to Do When the ProsecutorSays
No, 6 U. DAYTON L. REv. 95, 95 (1981). Indeed, it is generally accepted that plea bargaining
is a bureaucratic necessity. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970). See generally Erickson, The Finality of a Plea
of Guilty, 48 NoT DAm LAw. 835, 835 (1973) (judicial infrastructure presently insufficient
to afford every defendant a complete trial). Yet, despite its wide acceptance, neither the
prosecutor nor the defendant has a constitutional right or duty to execute a plea bargain.
See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560-61 (1977) (prosecutor under no constitutional duty to plea bargain); People v. Venable, 46 App. Div. 2d 73, 81, 361 N.Y.S.2d 398,
407 (3d Dep't 1974) (not improper to classify offenders differently based on availability of
plea bargaining).
70 Plea bargaining is the process whereby a criminal defendant promises to enter a certain plea in exchange for a concession from the prosecution. Note, The Legitimation of Plea
Bargaining:Remedies for Broken Promises, 11 Am. CraM. L. REv. 771, 774 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Broken Promises]. Typically, the defendant offers a guilty plea in exchange for a
lesser sentence and the opportunity to begin serving that sentence almost immediately. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). The prosecutor thereby is afforded an
opportunity to obtain a quick and certain conviction without subjecting his case to the uncertainties and expense of a trial. See Corbett, PleaBargaining,26 BROOKLYN BAMusTzR 99,
103 (1975); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining:Compromises By Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 865, 865-66 (1964); infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text. The
judicial system may be seen as a third-party beneficiary to such an agreement, since the
successful plea bargain reduces docket congestion and facilitates individualized justice by
allowing tailored application of the penal code. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 249 (1949).
71 CPL § 220.10 provides in pertinent part
3. [W]here the indictment charges but one crime, the defendant may, with both
the permission of the court and the consent of the people, enter a plea of guilty of
a lesser included offense.
4: [W]here the indictment charges two or more offenses in separate counts, the
defendant may, with both the permission of the court and the consent of the people, enter a plea of:
(b) Guilty of a lesser included offense with respect to any or all of the offenses
charged.
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ford the prosecution an opportunity to withdraw its consent to a
plea when the trial judge modifies a sentence in contravention of
the original bargain.72 The statutory scheme also provides that the
Appellate Division has the discretionary power to modify an "unduly harsh" sentence pursuant to section 470.15 of the CPL.75 ReCPL § 220.10(3), (4)(b) (1983). The statute was intended to prevent collusive bargains between the defendant and the prosecutor. See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 241, 318
N.E.2d 784, 793, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 635 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). A guilty
plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement operates as a conviction, see Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), and an effective waiver of fundamental rights, see, e.g., McCarthy
v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (privilege against self-incrimination and trial by
jury); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) (right to jury trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 402 (1965) (right to confront one's accusers). See generally Gallagher, Judicial
Participationin Plea Bargaining:A Search for New Standards,9 HARe. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
29, 30 (1974) (discussing constitutional rights waived by entrance of guilty plea).
73 See, e.g., People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 307, 419 N.E.2d 864, 866, 437 N.Y.S.2d
961, 963 (1981); People v. Ciccone, 91 App. Div. 2d 688, 688-89, 457 N.Y.S.2d 328, 330 (2d
Dep't 1982); People v. Biagini, 87 App. Div. 2d 634, 634-35, 448 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223 (2d Dep't
1982). In Farrar,the defendant was indicted for felony and intentional murder, attempted
murder, robbery, burglary, and criminal possession of a weapon. 52 N.Y.2d at 304, 419
N.E.2d at 864, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 961. Pretrial negotiations involving the prosecutor, the defendant, and the trial court produced a bargain whereby the defendant agreed to plead
guilty to first degree manslaughter in complete fulfillment of the original indictment. Id.
The prosecutor accepted the bargain with the understanding that the "defendant was to be
sentenced to a term of 8V3 to 25 years unless she was adjudicated a second felony offender."
Id. After sentencing, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which vacated the
sentence and remitted the case to the trial court for discretionary imposition of sentence. Id.
at 305, 419 N.E.2d at 865, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 962. The Court of Appeals held that the legislative policy embodied in CPL § 220.10 necessitated that the People be given the right, absent
special circumstances, to withdraw their consent. Id. at 307, 419 N.E.2d at 866, 437
N.Y.S.2d at 963. The Farrardecision established the People's right to have the plea vacated
and to proceed on the basis of the original indictment. See People v. Powell, 108 Misc. 2d
610, 614, 438 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1981).
Although the reach of the Farrardecision was originally unclear, 108 Misc. 2d. at 612,
438 N.Y.S.2d at 222, subsequent decisions clarified the holding. For example, the presence
of special circumstances, notably those involving manifest injustice to the defendant, will
preclude the People from asserting the right to withdraw consent to the plea. See, e.g.,
People v. Singletary, 112 Misc. 2d 1088, 1092-93, 448 N.Y.S.2d 394, 397 (Syracuse City Ct.
1982) (denial of withdrawal proper when disparity of sentences is de minimus and defendant has already begun serving sentence).
73 See CPL § 470.15(6)(b) (1983). The Appellate Division is authorized to review
sentences on appeal Id. § 450.10(2). The scope of review is quite broad, encompassing
sentences deemed "invalid as a matter of law," id. § 470.15(c), as well as those considered
"unduly harsh or severe," id. § 470.15(6)(b). See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 36 N.Y.2d 224,
228, 326 N.E.2d 784, 786, 367 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (1975) (power extends to error of both law
and fact).
The applicability of People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 419 N.E.2d 864, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961
(1981), to sentence modification by the Appellate Division was considered by the First Department in People v. Miles, 93 App. Div. 2d 776, 776-78, 461 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986-87 (1st
Dep't 1983). In Miles, two justices wrote concurring opinions, another concurred in the re-
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cently, in People v. Thompson,7 4 the Court of Appeals held that
the People do not have a right to withdraw their consent to a negotiated plea when the Appellate Division, rather than the trial
court, modifies the previously agreed-upon sentence.7 5
In Thompson, a 17-year-old was indicted for murder in the
second degree and for possession of a weapon in the first degree. 6
Before trial, the defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a plea of
guilty to manslaughter in the first degree. 7 The trial court adopted
the negotiated plea and sentenced the defendant to a term of eight
and one-third to twenty-five years imprisonment.7 On appeal by
the defendant, the Appellate Division found the sentence to be unduly harsh and reduced it to a term of three and one-third to ten
years.7 9 The case was then remitted to the trial court to afford the
prosecution an opportunity to withdraw its consent to the original
agreement. s0

On appeal by both the defendant and the prosecutor, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence imposed by the Appellate

Division.' Writing for the majority, 2 Judge Wachtler emphasized
sult only, and two wrote dissenting opinions. Justice Milonas considered the ruling in Farrar
to be "applicable to an appellate court." 93 App. Div. 2d at 778, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 987
(Milonas, J. concurring). Justice Carro, on the other hand, argued that Farraronly applied
at the trial level Id. at 779, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 988 (Carro, J., dissenting). Justice Bloom,
focusing on CPL § 470.15, argued that Farrarwas binding on the intermediate appellate
courts. 93 App. Div. 2d at 779-80, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 989 (Bloom, J., dissenting).
74 60 N.Y.2d 513, 458 N.E.2d 1228, 470 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1983).
75 Id. at 521, 458 N.E.2d at 1231, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 554.
76 Id. at 516-17, 458 N.E.2d at 1229, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 552. The defendant, Bentley
Thompson, shot and killed another youth in Brooklyn in 1978 after the victim accused him
of stealing a bicycle. Id. at 516, 458 N.E.2d at 1229, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 552. Although he originally denied the shooting, the defendant later claimed he had acted in self defense. Id. at
516-17, 458 N.E.2d at 1229, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 552. The trial court refused the defendant
youthful offender treatment. Id. at 517, 458 N.E.2d at 1229, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
7 Id. During the plea negotiations, the judge advised the defendant that he would receive a term of 81/ to 25 years. People v. Thompson, 91 App. Div. 2d 672, 672, 457 N.Y.S.2d
321, 322 (2d Dep't 1982). The People expressly conditioned their consent to the guilty plea
on judicial acquiescence to this imprisonment term. 60 N.Y.2d at 517, 458 N.E.2d at 1229,
470 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
78 People v. Thompson, 88 App. Div. 2d 939, 939, 450 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1019 (2d Dep't
1982).
71 People v. Thompson, 91 App. Div. 2d at 673, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
80 Id. at 673, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 322. The Appellate Division stated that the People enjoy
the "right to withdraw their consent to the plea in the event that the sentence sought to be
imposed is less than that originally negotiated by the parties." Id. (citing People v. Farrar,
52 N.Y.2d 302, 302, 419 N.E.2d 864, 866, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1981)).
81 60 N.Y.2d at 522, 458 N.E.2d at 1232, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
Judge Wachtler was joined in the majority opinion by Chief Judge Cooke and Judges
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that the judiciary has sole power over sentencing.8 3 The Court, citing People v. Farrar,4 recognized that section 220.10 of the CPL
requires the trial court to allow the People to withdraw their consent upon sentence modification, but concluded that the section
did not apply at the appellate level. 5 The distinction was based on
a strict reading of section 470.15,8" which makes no reference to
any obligation on the part of the Appellate Division
to present the
87
People with an option to withdraw their consent.
Judge Jasen, dissenting in part and concurring in part, characterized the sentence modification as a material, nonconsensual reformation of the negotiated bargain. 8 The dissent conceded that
the Appellate Division has the statutory power to modify an unduly harsh sentence, but refused to accept that the exercise of that
power could preclude the prosecutor from withdrawing his consent
to the plea bargain.89 Judge Jasen argued that the policies underlying the decision to permit the People to withdraw their consent are
equally, if not more, applicable at the appellate levelY0
Jones, Meyer, Simons, and Kaye. Judge Jasen filed a separate opinion in which he dissented
in part and concurred in part.
83 Id. at 520, 458 N.E.2d at 1230, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
- 52 N.Y.2d 302, 419 N.E.2d 864, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1981). See generally supra note 72
(discussion of Farrar).
83 60 N.Y.2d at 520, 458 N.E.2d at 1230-31, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The Thompson Court
interpreted CPL § 220.10 to apply "only to prosecutions of indictments at the trial court
level." Id. at 519, 458 N.E.2d at 1230, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 553. The Court noted that the express, broad grant of power to the Appellate Division to review sentences precludes application of CPL § 220.10, which was intended to apply only to the superior courts. Id. at 520,
458 N.E.2d at 1231, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
8 Id. at 519, 458 N.E.2d at 1231, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 554. Upon sentence modification, the
Court noted that an intermediate court "must itself impose some legally authorized lesser
sentence" pursuant to CPL § 470.20(6). Id. The majority interpreted this delegation of authority as the exclusive course of conduct open to the Appellate Division. Id.
87 See CPL § 470.15 (1983).
60 N.Y.2d at 522, 458 N.E.2d at 1234, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Jasen, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part).
19 Id. at 522, 458 N.E.2d at 1232-33, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 555 (Jasen, J., dissenting in part
and concurring in part).
Id. at 523, 458 N.E.2d at 1233-34, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57 (Jasen, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part). Judge Jasen noted that there was a need to prevent the abuse
of a court's sentencing power and to preserve the independent rule and special interests of
the prosecutor. Id. at 523-25, 458 N.E.2d at 1233-34, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 307-08,
419 N.E.2d 864, 866, 437 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (1981)). The dissent found these factors equally
motivating in the case of an alteration at the appellate level, 60 N.Y.2d at 523-25, 458
N.E.2d at 1233-34, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 556-57 (Jasen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part), and noted that the Appellate Division is not as well equipped as the trial court to rule
on sentencing since it possesses only a "sterile" record to evaluate, id. at 524, 458 N.E.2d at
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Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to bind participants
in plea negotiations in accordance with the strictures of classical
contract law."" Nevertheless, accepted principles of commercial
contract law frequently have been used to resolve disputes in this
area.9 2 Although a plea bargain should not be viewed as a "contract" for all purposes, it is submitted that contract law provides a
useful framework within which to analyze certain conflicts in the
plea bargaining process. This is particularly true in cases like
Thompson, where the prosecutor has performed his obligations
and the defendant's due process rights are no longer endangered.9 3
1233, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (Jasen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
01See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 238, 318 N.E.2d 784, 791-92, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623,
633 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). The Selikoff Court stated that the "application to plea negotiations of contract law is incongruous." Id. The Court referred to the societal goals of rehabilitation and deterrence arising from plea bargaining and convictions
which, it was argued, take the negotiated bargain out of the realm of traditional contract
analysis. Id. at 238, 318 N.E.2d at 791-92, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34; see also United States v.
Hughes, 223 F. Supp. 477, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1964) (plea
bargaining not governed by technical concepts of promise); People v. Forrest, 111 Misc. 2d
800, 801-02, 445 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Queens County 1981) (contract principles will not be applied as the sentence promised is implicitly conditioned on its
appropriateness).
' See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (plea agreement resting on inducement and consideration will be enforced); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 809 (1970) (noting mutuality of advantage to defendant and the prosecutor); Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (plea agreement is enforceable if made without duress). Most disputes over the finality of a plea of guilty concern whether or not the defendant entered it voluntarily and with full knowledge of the consequences. See Note, PostConviction Relief from Pleas of Guilty: A DiminishingRight, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 182, 193
(1971); see also Comment, Plea BargainingMishaps-The Possibility of CollaterallyAttacking the Resultant Plea of Guilty, 65 J. Cums. L. & CRUMNOLOGY 170, 174 (1974) (negotiation, promise inducement, expectation, consideration, reliance, benefit of the bargain, and
substantial performance are concepts of contract law commonly applied to plea negotiations); infra note 93 (application of contract principles in fixing remedies for broken plea
agreements).
" Most courts that have rejected contract analysis have done so in order to benefit a
defendant whose due process rights allegedly have been violated. See, e.g., United States v.
Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Cooper v.
United States, 594 F.2d 12, 17 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1979). These courts have based their decisions
on the fact that the prosecutor's constitutional duty to fulfill his promise adds a dimension
to the plea bargain that removes it from the realm of general commercial contract law. See,
e.g., Cooper, 594 F.2d at 16. It is suggested, however, that when a defendant's due process
rights are not at issue, the use of contract principles is appropriate. See id. at 17 (refusal to
adopt contract analysis in due process situation is not a rejection of its use in other circumstances). Moreover, once the prosecutor has performed his promise, the defendant's due
process rights are no longer endangered. Cf. Johnson v. Mabry, 707 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.
1983) (contract analogy works well in usual plea bargain circumstances but fails when the
plea agreement is not yet finalized); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir.
1980) (although related to the criminal justice system, the plea bargain is to be viewed from
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A negotiated plea bargain is finalized upon adoption by the trial
court." Material alteration of the terms of a plea bargain after
finalization frustrates the parties' expectations and, thus, undermines a central premise of the bargain itself.9 5 Such a result can be
prevented if the People are afforded an appropriate contractual
remedy and are not burdened by a new bargain with terms that
have been neither negotiated nor accepted. 6
In addition, it is submitted that the Thompson holding will
have an adverse impact on the plea negotiation process.9 7 Traditionally, the prosecutor is afforded broad discretion to promote efficiency in plea bargaining. 8 By attempting to reinforce the posia contractual posture); United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979) (traditional contract analysis is appropriate when the content of the plea agreement is in dispute).
See People v. McCasland, 55 App. Div. 2d 991, 992, 391 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (3d Dep't
1977). The final judgment as to whether a plea bargain will be accepted often, in practice,
rests with the trial judge. See Akron v. Ragsdale, 61 Ohio App. 2d 107, 112, 399 N.E.2d 119,
121 (1978); J. BoND, supra note 69, § 6.17(b), at 642.
95 See Thompson, 60 N.Y.2d at 525, 458 N.E.2d at 1234, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Jasen argued that when the prosecutor's
consent is conditioned on a particular sentence, the nonfulfillment of that condition invalidates the entire negotiated agreement. Id.; see also Gallagher, supra note 71, at 33 (sentence
is a material provision of the negotiated bargain); cf. People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 412,
406 N.E.2d 1347, 1352, 429 N.Y.S.2d 410, 416 (1980) (sentence moderation is essential to the
bargaining process); People v. Suitte, 90 App. Div. 2d 80, 85, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (2d
Dep't 1982) (plea bargain concerned most with fixing the degree of sentence and the offense
charged). It should be noted, moreover, that alteration of a term of the bargain would not
entail an automatic right of withdrawal of consent by the prosecutor. See State v. Rivest,
106 Wis. 2d 406, 411, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982).
93Remedies for broken plea agreements have often been fashioned in accordance with
traditional contractual remedies. See, e.g., People v. Flynn, 42 App. Div. 2d 919, 920, 348
N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (4th Dep't 1973) (return to status quo ante or specific performance are
most common remedies). See generally Comment, supra note 69, at 110-13 (specific performance and rescission are proper forms of relief for the broken plea agreement). The Supreme Court of the United States has sanctioned either withdrawal of the plea or an order
of specific performance. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). Instances in
which New York courts have allowed withdrawal illustrate how contract law is used to fashion remedies. Compare People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340, 347, 402 N.E.2d 133, 135, 425
N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (1980) (defendant who has testified to his detriment and cannot be restored to the status quo should be granted specific performance) with People v. Fernandez,
45 App. Div. 2d 953, 953, 359 N.Y.S.2d 314, 316 (1st Dep't 1974) (nonperformance of material condition of bargain mandates withdrawal of plea) and People v. Taylor, 64 App. Div.
2d 998, 999, 408 N.Y.S.2d 835, 837 (3d Dep't 1978) (withdrawal desirable when prosecutor
does not fulfill his promise to refrain from making sentence recommendation to judge).
97See 60 N.Y.2d at 525, 458 N.E.2d at 1233-34, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (Jasen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
98 See Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1980). The Scotland court
enumerated the essential functions of the prosecutor.
(1) to act as an administrator and dispose of cases in the fastest, most efficient

1984]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

tion of the court as the final arbiter of sentencing, 9 it appears that
the Court of Appeals has diluted the certainty of the plea bargain
and thereby has lessened its effectiveness as a prosecutorial bargaining tool.""0 Indeed, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals
has restored the very uncertainties and risks that a negotiated sentence was intended to circumvent by rendering irrevocable the
prosecutor's consent to a bargain that is subsequently materially
altered.10 1 By determining when the prosecutor's consent is needed
to modify a plea bargain on the basis of whether the Appellate Division or the trial court is making the modification, it appears that
the majority has denied the prosecutor basic fairness and has im-

manner; (2) to act as an advocate for the state to maximize convictions and severity of sentences; (3) to judge the individual's social circumstances and ensure fairness; (4) to act as a quasi-legislator, granting concessions because the law is too
harsh.
Id. at 364 (footnote omitted); see J. BoND, supra note 69, § 5.4, at 5-8; see also Westen &
Westin, A ConstitutionalLaw of Remedies for Broken PleaBargains,66 CALn'. L. Rev. 471,
486 (1978) (prosecutor may be vested with "final authority within the jurisdiction to establish prosecutorial policy").
"See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
100 See Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. Cm. L. REv. 50, 52
(1968). The severity of sentence is an important factor affecting the prosecutor's choice of
concessions since "the prosecutor must estimate the sentence that seems likely after a conviction at trial, discount this sentence by the possibility of acquittal, and balance the 'discounted trial sentence' against the sentence he can insure through a plea agreement." Id.;
see also Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAw & CoNTr. PROBS.,
Winter 1977, at 102, 109 (the sentence is an instrument of barter between adversaries);
Note, The Role of Plea Negotiations in Modern Criminal Law, 46 Cm.-KErr L. Rev. 116,
117 (1969) (sentence concessions by the prosecutor are prime tools of inducement toward
the defendant's guilty plea). Thus, denying the prosecutor the right to withdraw consent to
a plea bargain where the sentence terms have subsequently been modified diminishes the
ability of the prosecutor to perform his discretionary functions. See Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1980).
101 See Broken Promises, supra note 70, at 773 (entrance into plea bargain motivated
by desire to avoid unfavorable trial results); Note, supra, note 70 at 868 (weak evidence and
unreliability of witnesses often prompt prosecutors to plea bargain); accord Corbett, supra
note 70, at 101; see also Westen & Westin, supra note 98, at 492 (plea bargaining enables
the prosecutor to avoid risk of acquittal at trial); cf. People v. McConnell, 49 N.Y.2d 340,
346, 402 N.E.2d 133, 135, 425 N.Y.S.2d 794, 797 (1980) (substantial performance of plea
bargain by defendant necessitates specific performance to ensure certainty); Uvilier, supra
note 100, at 109 (defendant seeks a higher level of certainty by entrance into negotiated
bargain).
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paired the effectiveness of the plea bargain in the criminal justice
system.
Thomas M. Gandolfo

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 400.21: The defendant has the burden of proving the unconstitutionality of a predicate conviction asserted by the People
Section 400.21 of the Criminal Procedure Law governs the
procedure for sentencing a defendant as a second felony offender.10 2 Pursuant to this section, the prosecution must prove the
existence of any predicate felony conviction it intends to use to
enhance the defendant's sentence. 10 3 The defendant, however, is
1o See CPL § 400.21 (1983). A second felony offender is defined as "a person, other
than a second violent felony offender.., who stands convicted of a felony... other than a
class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony
convictions." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.06(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1983-1984).
CPL § 400.21 contains provisions substantially identical to three other enhancement
statutes. See CPL § 400.15 (1983) (procedure for determining whether defendant is a second
violent felony offender); CPL § 400.16 (1983) (procedure for determining whether defendant
is a persistent violent felony offender); CPL § 400.20 (1983) (procedure for determining
whether defendant should be sentenced as a persistent felony offender). These sections generally are applied in a similar manner, see People v. Leston, 117 Misc. 2d 712, 714, 459
N.Y.S.2d 364, 366 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983); People v. Graham, 111 Misc. 2d 666, 669-70,
444 N.Y.S.2d 988, 990 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981); CPL § 400.15, commentary at 218-19
(1983), and, therefore, for the purposes of this survey, will be referred to interchangeably.
Recidivist statutes, such as CPL § 400.21, are designed to subject repeat offenders to
punishment of a more severe nature. See CPL § 400.21, commentary at 235 (1983). Recidivist statutes have survived a wide range of constitutional attacks. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980) (cruel and unusual punishment); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448, 451-54 (1962) (notice and opportunity to be heard); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S.
616, 625, 629-30 (1912) (due process and equal protection); Leston, 117 Misc. 2d at 713, 459
N.Y.S.2d at 365 (ex post facto challenge). See generally Note, Recidivist Procedures:
Prejudice and Due Process, 53 CORNELL L. Rsv. 337, 337 & n.1 (1968) (discussion of the
continued stability of recidivist statutes despite numerous constitutional attacks).
103 CPL § 400.21(7)(a) (1983). In addition to proving the existence of a predicate conviction, the prosecution must prove that the defendant to be sentenced was in fact the person convicted of the prior felony. Id. Section 400.21(2) of the CPL requires that the
prosecutor file a statement before sentence is imposed. Id. § 400.21(2). The statement must
set forth the specifies of the date and place of each alleged predicate felony conviction the
People intend to use for enhancement purposes. Id.; see People v. Towns, 94 App. Div. 2d
973, 973, 464 N.Y.S.2d 100, 100 (4th Dep't 1983); People v. Brown, 54 App. Div. 2d 719, 719,

